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WILL THERE BE A FREEZE ON COLD HITS?




DNA1 solved the case of a seventy-eight year old grandmother,
who was raped and strangled to death in her home.2  Ten years
after her death, a match in the state’s DNA databank revealed that
the grandmother’s assailant was Millous Temple, who was serving
time in prison for molesting two of his grandchildren.3  Temple’s
DNA matched the DNA collected from the grandmother’s crime
scene, resulting in a “cold hit.”4
In a different case, DNA exonerated Clyde Charles from a
rape conviction after he spent over a decade in prison pleading his
innocence.5  DNA has become a powerful tool in solving crimes
and exonerating the innocent.  The Combined DNA Index System
(“CODIS”) has produced approximately 5,000 cold hits nationwide
by matching offender profiles with samples from unsolved crimes.6
A recent study showed that over one hundred rapes could have
been prevented if every state had started collecting DNA in 1990.7
This note discusses the growing debate over which analytical
* Notes & Comments Editor, New York City Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2005, City
University of New York School of Law.  I would like to thank my parents, Barbara and
Richard Magid, my sisters, Carol and Diane, and Professor Robson for all of their help
and support.
1 DNA is the popular term for deoxyribonucleic acid.  See infra Part I: DNA Back-
ground/Perspective.
2 The state law requires compulsory DNA collection from certain convicted of-
fenders. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.117 (2004).
3 Lisa Donovan, Police: DNA Solves Woman’s 1994 Killing, PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 13,
2004, at 1B, available at http://www.twincities.com.
4 A “cold hit” occurs when a DNA database matches the DNA of a known offender
with DNA collected from the scene of an unsolved crime.  See infra Part I: DNA Back-
ground/Perspective.
5 The Case For Innocence: Synopsis, FRONTLINE (2000), at http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/etc/synopsis.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2004).
6 Cindy Van Auken, Collecting DNA Samples May Become As Common As Fingerprint-
ing, WACO HERALD-TRIBUNE, at http://www.wacotrib.com/news/newsfd/auto/feed/
news/2002/08/04/1028476418.04019.6528.1547.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2004).
7 Mark Hansen, DNA Study Shows What Might Have Been: Crimes Could Have Been
Prevented With More Sampling, DOJ Survey Says, 3 No. 16 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 5, at 1
(2004) [hereinafter DNA Study].
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approach the courts should apply when addressing the constitu-
tionality of DNA collection statutes.  Currently, every court in the
United States deciding whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits
the collection of DNA samples from qualifying convicted felons for
entry in state and federal DNA indexing systems has found that the
collection does not violate the Fourth Amendment as an unreason-
able search and seizure.8  However, these courts are split on which
analytical method to apply in upholding these statutory DNA
searches.9  This note will examine the United States v. Kincade10 deci-
sion as well as other recent decisions that take alternative ap-
proaches to resolving whether the DNA statutes violate the Fourth
Amendment.11
On rehearing en banc in United States v. Kincade, the court re-
versed an earlier decision of the panel,12 and found that the collec-
tion of DNA samples from qualifying convicted felons pursuant to
the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (“DNA Act”)13
8 See, e.g., Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding state DNA
statute under the special needs exception); Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Jus-
tice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding federal DNA Act under the totality of
the circumstances approach); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1083 (2003) (upholding federal DNA Act under the special needs
exception); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding state DNA statute
under the special needs exception); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992)
(upholding state DNA statute under the totality of the circumstances approach);
Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2003 WL 256774 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003) (up-
holding state DNA statute under the special needs exception); Padgett v. Ferrero, 294
F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (upholding state DNA statute under totality of the
circumstances analysis); State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003), appeal
denied, 809 N.E.2d 32 (Ohio 2004) (upholding state DNA statute under the special
needs exception); State v. Martinez, 78 P.3d 769 (Kan. 2003) (upholding state DNA
statute under the special needs exception); United States v. Stegman, 295 F. Supp. 2d
542 (D. Md. 2003) (upholding federal DNA statute under the totality of the circum-
stances approach).
9 See id.
10 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
11 There are two basic analyses that the courts have adopted in deciding this issue:
the basic Fourth Amendment reasonableness test, which examines the totality of the
circumstances (see infra Part III) and the special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, which inquires whether there is a special need
beyond the ordinary law enforcement purpose (see infra Part IV).
12 A three-judge panel in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the DNA
Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, holding that the DNA Act violated the
Fourth Amendment because the collection of DNA samples constituted “suspicionless
searches with the objective of furthering law enforcement purposes.”  United States v.
Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d en banc, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir.
2004).  Appellee’s motion for rehearing en banc was argued on March 23, 2004.
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
13 Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726; 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a (West 2004).
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was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.14  The court re-
affirmed its 1995 decision in Rise v. Oregon,15 in which it had ap-
plied the traditional Fourth Amendment totality of the
circumstances test in upholding the constitutionality of a state
DNA statute.16
Part I of this paper will discuss the DNA Act,17 CODIS, DNA
profiling, and “cold hits.”  Part II will review the United States v. Kin-
cade decision.18  Part III will review the Kincade court’s use of the
totality of the circumstances test and consider the effectiveness of
this approach.  Part IV will examine the use of the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  This
section will also discuss the impact of two important Supreme
Court decisions, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond19 and Ferguson v. City
of Charleston,20 including their effect on subsequent cases that apply
the special needs doctrine to validate the constitutionality of the
DNA Act.  Part V will offer an alternative approach to DNA collec-
tion through standard police booking procedures, which would ef-
fectively circumvent the contested Fourth Amendment issue at
hand.
I: DNA BACKGROUND/PERSPECTIVE
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is much like an individual’s own
personal barcode21 or “the blueprint of life.”22  “[It] is the funda-
mental building block for an individual’s entire genetic makeup.  It
is a component of virtually every cell in the human body, and a
person’s DNA is the same in every cell.”23  No two individuals have
the same DNA except for identical twins,24 which is why DNA test-
14 379 F.3d 813, 840 (9th Cir. 2004).
15 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995).
16 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 831-32.  The traditional Fourth Amendment test balances
the totality of the circumstances to determine the reasonableness of a particular
search. The following factors are considered: the individual’s privacy interests, the
level of intrusion, and the government’s interest in the search. Id.
17 Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726; 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a (West 2004).
18 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
19 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
20 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
21 Ann Meeker-O’Connell, How DNA Evidence Works, at http://science.how-
stuffworks.com/dna-evidence.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
22 HENRY C. LEE, PH.D. & FRANK TIRNADY, BLOOD EVIDENCE 3 (Perseus Publishing
2003).
23 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES 5 (July 2002), available
at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf. See RON FRIDELL, DNA FINGER-
PRINTING: THE ULTIMATE IDENTITY 20 (Franklin Watts 2001); LEE, supra note 22, at 4.
24 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 23. See LEE, supra note 22, at 4.
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ing or “profiling” has become such a powerful tool in solving
crimes.25  When police evidence technicians canvass a crime scene,
they search for a suspect’s blood, saliva, semen, hair, and skin cells,
which are all sources of DNA that may link a perpetrator to a
crime.26  After the samples are collected, scientists extract the DNA
at a lab to determine the DNA profile and to see if there is a match
from a known suspect.  If no known suspect’s profile is identified,
the sample can then be transmitted to state and national databanks
for comparisons.27
The DNA Act provides that “[t]he probation office responsi-
ble for the supervision under the Federal law of an individual on
probation, parole, or supervised release shall collect a DNA sample
from each such individual who is, or has been, convicted of a quali-
fying federal offense or a qualifying military offense.”28  Qualifying
federal offenses include homicides, sexual offenses, kidnapping,
robbery, and burglary, as well as conspiracy to commit any of these
offenses.29  Failure of an individual to cooperate in the collection
of a DNA sample is a misdemeanor offense30 and the supervising
probation office is authorized to restrain or detain, if necessary,
any individual who refuses to cooperate in the collection of a DNA
sample.31  Additionally, the Act requires:
[t]he director of the Bureau of Prisons or the probation office
responsible (as applicable) shall furnish each DNA sample col-
lected . . . to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
who shall carry out a DNA analysis on each such DNA sample
and include their results in CODIS.32
CODIS, the Combined DNA Index System, is a national index
of DNA samples maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), which “blends forensic science and computer technology
25 Minnesota Department of Public Safety: Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Fo-
rensic Science Laboratory, Guide to DNA Analysis, at http://www.dps.state.mn.us/bca/
lab/documents/DNAbroc03.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). See Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, Combined D.N.A. Index System (CODIS) Home Page, at http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/codis/index1.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004); LEE, supra note 22, at vii;
FRIDELL, supra note 23, at 67 (discussing violent crime).
26 FRIDELL, supra note 23, at 66.
27 Michael Zeigler, DNA “Cold Hits” Put Freeze on Felons, DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE,
Oct. 20, 2003, available at http://www.DemocratandChronicle.com. See FRIDELL, supra
note 23, at 68.
28 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2) (West 2004).
29 Id. § 14135a(d).
30 Id. § 14135a(a)(5).
31 Id. § 14135a(4)(A).
32 Id. § 14135a(b).
2005] WILL THERE BE A FREEZE ON COLD HITS? 189
into an effective tool for solving violent crimes.”33  All fifty states
and the federal government have statutes authorizing the collec-
tion and databank storage of DNA samples of certain convicted
felons.34  The CODIS system has been successful in producing
“cold hits,” resulting “when the DNA profile from an unsolved
crime sample matches an offender in an offender databank.”35
II: THE UNITED STATES V. KINCADE DECISION
The Ninth Circuit is not the first court to address the constitu-
tionality of the federal DNA Act or similar state DNA statutes.  A
majority of the circuits have reviewed Fourth Amendment chal-
lenges to the state and federal DNA collection statutes, but remain
split in their Fourth Amendment analyses.36  On rehearing United
States v. Kincade en banc in a six-five split decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the DNA Act.37  In Kincade, the court reaffirmed its
reasoning from Rise v. Oregon38 and “its reliance on a totality of the
circumstances analysis to uphold compulsory DNA profiling of
convicted offenders” in accord with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.39
Thomas Kincade, who pled guilty to armed bank robbery, re-
fused to submit a blood sample for DNA analysis.40  Kincade
33 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Combined D.N.A. Index System (CODIS) Home
Page, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/index1.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2004).
See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 23.
34 See Phillip B.C. Jones, Arresting Developments in DNA Typing, at http://forensic-
evidence.com/site/Biol_Evid/BioEvid_dna_jones.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004);
Mark Ballard, A Time of Growth For DNA Databases, NAT’L L.J., June 6, 2003, at http://
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1052440832766 (last visited Dec. 21, 2004).
35 California Department of Justice, Cold Hit Statistics, at http://coldhit.doj.ca.gov/
dna/stats.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2004). See LEE, supra note 22, at 291.
36 See Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding the DNA col-
lection statutes under the special needs doctrine); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d
1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1083, (2003) (same); Roe v.
Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (same). But cf. Groceman v. United States
Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir.  2004) (upholding the DNA collection
statutes under the traditional Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances test);
Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,
306 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).
37 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135a); Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000).
38 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of the state DNA
statute under the traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test).  Since the state and
federal DNA collection statutes are so similar in language and content, the courts
have applied the same standards for both.
39 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832.
40 Id. at 820-21.  Robbery is a qualifying offense under 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 14135a(d)(1)(E) (West 2004).
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claimed that it was a suspicionless search violative of his Fourth
Amendment rights.41  In reviewing this same issue, several courts
have upheld the constitutionality of the DNA collection statutes
under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement.42  However, other courts have upheld these
statutes by applying a pure Fourth Amendment totality of the cir-
cumstances test.43  While not rejecting the special needs analysis,
the court in Kincade relied on its precedent, Rise v. Oregon,44 and
applied the traditional Fourth Amendment totality of the circum-
stances test.45  In upholding the Oregon DNA collection statute,
the court in Rise had followed the totality of the circumstances ap-
proach used in United States v. Knights,46 which based its decision on
the following factors: the reduced expectation of privacy, the de-
gree of intrusion, and the likelihood of advancing the public
interest.47
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gould affirmed the majority’s
opinion but believed the court should have applied the special
needs analysis rather than the totality of the circumstances test.48
Noting the stronger precedent under the special needs theory,
Judge Gould suggested that the Supreme Court would uphold the
compulsory collection of DNA samples under the special needs
41 Id. at 821.
42 See, e.g., Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that Wisconsin’s
state DNA statute comports with the Fourth Amendment under the special needs
doctrine); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1083 (2003) (finding that the collection of DNA for the federal DNA databank,
CODIS, is reasonable under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment);
Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that the Connecticut DNA stat-
ute fell within the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment). See infra Part
IV: Special Needs Doctrine.
43 See, e.g., Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir.
2004) (finding that the collection of DNA from convicted federal felons is constitu-
tional after considering circumstantial factors such as inmate status and relinquish-
ment of privacy rights for identification purposes); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307
(4th Cir. 1992) (finding that the Virginia DNA databanks do not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the Commonwealth’s interest in preventing felony recidivism
outweighed the minimal intrusion of taking a DNA sample); United States v.
Stegman, 295 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550 (D. Md. 2003) (finding that the DNA Act of 2000 is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338,
1344 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (finding that the identification of convicted felons is a legiti-
mate state interest which justifies the minimal intrusion of those convicted felons who
have diminished privacy rights).
44 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995).
45 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 831-32.
46 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
47 Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562. See infra Part III: Totality of the Circumstances Approach:
The Traditional Fourth Amendment Balancing Test.
48 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 840 (Gould, J., concurring).
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doctrine.49  The deterrent effect of the DNA program would serve
“the special needs of a supervised release system” with the goal of
preventing future crimes.50  Moreover, Judge Gould opined that
“any use of the CODIS database to solve past crimes is incidental to
the special and forward-looking penalogical need that justifies the
program.”51
Five judges dissented in Kincade,52 addressing their concern
for “the dangers inherent in allowing the government to collect
and store information about its citizens in a centralized place.”53
The strong dissent criticized the plurality’s totality of the circum-
stances approach, as well as the special needs doctrine favored by
the concurring judge, in upholding the constitutionality of the
DNA Act.54  The dissent warned that upholding the DNA Act
under either of these two Fourth Amendment analyses, especially
the totality of the circumstances test, threatened the traditional
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, which is designed to protect
citizens against arbitrary and invasive government actions.55
III: TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH: THE
TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT BALANCING TEST
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is always “reasona-
bleness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental in-
vasion of a citizen’s personal security.”56  An essential purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect and safeguard the privacy in-
terests of individuals who are subject to searches and seizures
against arbitrary government intrusions.57  Although the Fourth
Amendment generally requires probable cause, reasonable suspi-
cion may be constitutionally sufficient in limited circumstances





52 Judges Reinhardt, Pregerson, Kozinski, Wardlaw, and Hawkins. Id. at 842, 871,
875.
53 Id. at 843.
54 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 851, 854.
55 Id.
56 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
57 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989). See
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989) (finding that drug testing
customs employees did not constitute an arbitrary or oppressive search); Kincade, 379
F.3d at 851.
58 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001).
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Although searches under the DNA collection statutes impli-
cate Fourth Amendment concerns, federal and state courts none-
theless have upheld these statutes, based upon the reasonableness
of the totality of the circumstances.  In applying this traditional
Fourth Amendment test, the courts weigh several factors: “an in-
mate’s diminished privacy rights, the minimal intrusion involved,
and the legitimate government interest in using DNA to investigate
[and solve past and future] crime[s].”59  In upholding the constitu-
tionality of the DNA Act, the court in Kincade balanced “the degree
to which DNA profiling interferes with the privacy interests of
qualified federal offenders against the significance of the public
interests served by such profiling.”60 Kincade upheld the constitu-
tionality of the suspicionless searches authorized by the DNA Act
under the totality of the circumstances test, even in the absence of
non-law enforcement special needs.61
The court in Kincade justified its avoidance of the Fourth
Amendment’s suspicion requirement through its interpretation of
United States v. Knights.62  According to the plurality in Kincade,
Knights left open the question of whether suspicionless searches of
probationers, conducted for law enforcement purposes, are consti-
tutional under the Fourth Amendment.63  As such, the court found
that:
[S]uch a severe and fundamental disruption in the relationship
between the offender and society, along with the government’s
concomitantly greater interest in closely monitoring and super-
59 Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (af-
firming Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2003), in which the court applied
these factors to determine the reasonableness of DNA collection). See Green v. Berge,
354 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132,1146 (10th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1083 (2003); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir.
1999); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sczubelek,
255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (D. Del. 2003); Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338,
1344-45 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
60 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 836.
61 Id. at 835.
62 Id. at 827 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (finding that the
warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment because the search was supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a
condition of probation)).
63 Id. at 830.  However, it is important to note that Knights did not involve a suspi-
cionless search of a probationer.  The officer’s search in Knights was supported by
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 829.  As courts have only upheld suspicionless searches
under the special needs doctrine where a program serves a non-law enforcement pur-
pose, the dissent in Kincade criticized the plurality’s totality of the circumstances ap-
proach, arguing it completely dodged the Fourth Amendment’s suspicion
requirement. Id. at 860 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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vising conditional releasees, is in turn sufficient to sustain suspi-
cionless searches of his person and property even in the absence
of some non-law enforcement “special need” – at least where
such searches meet the Fourth Amendment touchstone of rea-
sonableness as gauged by the totality of the circumstances.64
Only in limited circumstances, when there is a non-law en-
forcement special need, has the court upheld suspicionless
searches.65
1. Expectation of Privacy
Katz v. United States established the principle that the Fourth
Amendment implicitly protects an individual’s expectation of pri-
vacy.66  The Court held that “the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places.  What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . .
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . [b]ut what
[an individual] seeks to preserve as private . . . may be constitution-
ally protected.”67  Subsequently, the Supreme Court has identified
certain instances where an individual may have a reduced expecta-
tion of privacy.  Employees of regulated industries have a reduced
expectation of privacy due to the need to ensure safety, even with
respect to personal searches.68  Individuals on probation also have
a diminished expectation of privacy.69  “Inherent in the very nature
of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty
to which every citizen is entitled.”70  As such, “a court granting pro-
bation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender
of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”71
64 Id. at 835.
65 Id. at 862 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  The large dissent in Kincade criticized the
plurality’s interpretation of Knights and its totality of the circumstances analysis where
a suspicionless law enforcement search was at issue. Id. at 860-61.
66 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
67 Id. at 351 (citation omitted).
68 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989)
(upholding blood, urine, and breathalyzer searches of railway employees to ensure
safety). See also Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989) (uphold-
ing urine searches of United States Customs employees to ensure safety and the integ-
rity of the United States borders).
69 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868 (1987) (holding that a warrantless search of a probationer’s home by a probation
officer per se satisfies the Fourth Amendment because the probationer is under cus-
tody and such status subjects him to particular regulations which condone such
searches).
70 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
71 Id. (internal quotations omitted). See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874-75 (stating that
restrictive probation conditions serve a rehabilitative as well as a public safety
function).
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In weighing this factor, the Kincade court held that Kincade’s
status as a parolee subjected him to a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy,72 thereby notably distinguishing his search from the searches
invalidated in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond73 and Ferguson v. City of
Charleston.74  The pregnant women subjected to drug testing in Fer-
guson75 and the motorists stopped at drug checkpoints in Edmond
were free citizens76 who enjoyed a greater expectation of privacy
than Kincade, a convicted felon on parole.77  Because convicted
felons do not enjoy the same privacy rights as free citizens, searches
that involve minimal intrusions and which are based upon legiti-
mate governmental interests will survive Fourth Amendment
implications.
2. Level of Intrusion
The Supreme Court has upheld suspicionless searches that in-
trude upon an individual’s bodily integrity when they are reasona-
ble searches requiring minimal intrusion.78  Kincade, a parolee,
was required to submit a blood sample for entry into CODIS, the
federal DNA database, pursuant to the DNA Act.79  Citing Schmerber
v. California,80 the court stressed that blood testing has become
routine and commonplace in our everyday life, therefore amount-
ing to only a minimal intrusion of the body.81
Other courts have also recently found that the bodily intrusion
of taking a blood or saliva sample results in only a minor intru-
72 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 833 (9th Cir. 2004). See Knights, 534 U.S.
112 (2001); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875 (probationers “do not enjoy the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special probation restrictions.”).
73 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
74 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
75 See id. at 71.
76 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
77 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 820.
78 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), the Court ap-
proved blood and urine tests and breathalyzers and in Treasury Employees v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989), the Court held that urine samples were reasonable searches.
However, it is important to note that both of these cases involved non-law enforce-
ment suspicionless searches upheld under the special needs doctrine.
79 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 820-21. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a(a) (West 2004) which
specifies the procedure for collecting DNA samples, but does not specify the type of
DNA sample required.  However, § 14135(a)(c)(1) defines the term “DNA sample” as
“a tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample of an individual on which a DNA analysis can
be carried out.”  There is no requirement that the sample must be a blood extraction.
80 384 U.S. 757 (1966).  The Schmerber opinion notes that the quantity of blood
taken is minimal and for the majority of individuals “the procedure involves virtually
no risk, trauma, or pain.” Id. at 771.
81 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 836-37.
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sion.82  Buccal swabbing has gained recent popularity over blood
tests because it requires much less intrusion than taking a blood
sample.83  A buccal swab is taken by gently swabbing the inside of
the cheek to collect epithelial cells,84 which is a nonintrusive and
painless procedure.85
3. Governmental Interest
Courts addressing the constitutionality of statutes which re-
quire the collection of DNA samples from qualifying convicted
felons have offered several governmental interests for permitting
these suspicionless searches: the government’s “special need” to fill
the CODIS system with DNA samples from qualifying convicted
felons,86 obtaining reliable and accurate identification of convicted
felons,87 and using DNA to investigate and solve crimes.88  Courts
82 See Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that “[t]he intru-
sion on the plaintiffs’ limited privacy interest is far less than that on unsuspecting
pregnant women in a hospital but otherwise free of state custody”); Roe v. Marcotte,
193 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that the state’s DNA statute provided adequate
safeguards to ensure minimal intrusion); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th
Cir. 1997) (holding DNA collection was minimal intrusion and therefore reasonable
search and seizure in light of inmate’s reduced privacy rights); Padgett v. Ferrereo,
294 F. Supp. 2d 1338,1342 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (finding that taking a DNA sample is a
minimal intrusion and “not significantly greater than taking fingerprints or a photo-
graph”). See also United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (D. Del. 2003)
(noting that the minimal intrusion of taking blood has “become an accepted part of
daily life”).
83 See LEE, supra note 22, at 16.
84 The buccal cells found in the cheek area are highly concentrated with DNA.
Frequently Asked Questions About DNA Testing, at http://www.dnatestingcentre.com/
FAQ.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2004).
85 There is no difference in the accuracy of test results between blood samples and
buccal swabbing because “DNA is the same in all nucleated cells of a person’s body.”
See Genetic Identity Frequently Asked Questions, at http://genetic-identity.com/FAQ/faq.
html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
86 This interest will benefit the public as well as the defendants who submit their
DNA samples. See United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1083 (2003) (finding that the need to build a DNA databank fits
within the special needs doctrine “because the desire to build a DNA database goes
beyond the ordinary law enforcement need”); Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. at 323 (finding
that the searches pursuant to the DNA Act fall with the special needs doctrine).
87 See Green, 354 F.3d at 679 (finding an important state interest in obtaining relia-
ble identification of convicted felons); Padgett, 294 F. Supp. at 1342; United States v.
Stegman, 295 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548 (D. Md. 2003) (citing Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d
302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that there is a governmental interest in creating an
identification record of convicted felons for the purpose of resolving past and future
crimes)).
88 Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir.
2004). See Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (finding that one of the ultimate goals of
the DNA Act is to solve past and future crimes); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 82 (2d
Cir. 1999) (upholding the state’s DNA statute under the special needs doctrine due to
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have held that these legitimate governmental interests of the DNA
Act outweigh the minimal intrusion of taking a DNA sample on a
parolee’s reduced privacy interests.89  The court in Kincade, citing
Rise, held that once a person is convicted of a qualifying offense
under the DNA Act, his/her identity becomes a matter of state in-
terest.90  The court further stressed that the searches authorized
under the DNA Act serve society’s “overwhelming interest” in de-
terring future crime and reducing recidivism.91
4. Critique of the Totality of the Circumstances Test
The strong dissent in Kincade argued that under the totality of
the circumstances test applied by the plurality, all Americans who
have a reduced expectation of privacy would be susceptible to com-
pulsory DNA extractions for entry into a DNA databank.92  The dis-
sent’s primary concern with the totality of the circumstances
analysis is that the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of suspicion
is completely ignored.93  The overriding principle of the Fourth
Amendment requires a government official to have some quantum
of individualized suspicion to search an individual in order to ob-
tain evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.94  The dissent in
Kincade stressed the danger of the plurality’s willingness to uphold
a suspicionless law enforcement search under the totality of the
circumstances approach: “Under such an approach, all of us would
inevitably have our liberty eroded when our privacy interests
are balanced against the ‘monumental’ interests of law
enforcement.”95
The premise of the totality of the circumstances test is to guide
the high rate of recidivism among sexual offenders and DNA’s usefulness in solving
crimes); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that the
government has a legitimate interest in investigating and prosecuting crimes).
89 See Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413-14 (federal DNA Act); Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 (Vir-
ginia statute).
90 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Rise v. Ore-
gon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995)).
91 Id. at 838-39.
92 Id. at 844.  The dissent offers a list of citizens who have a reduced expectation of
privacy: “attendees of public high schools or universities, persons seeking to obtain
driver’s licenses, applicants for federal employment, or persons requiring any form of
federal identification, and those who desire to travel by airplane . . . [as well as] citi-
zens in the Armed Forces.”  Id.
93 Id. at 860-61. The dissent noted the plurality’s inability to cite “a single case that
has applied the totality of the circumstances test to a regime of suspicionless
searches,” suggesting that there are none. Id. at 862.
94 Id. at 864.
95 Id.
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the courts in determining whether probable cause or reasonable
suspicion exists.  When there is reasonable suspicion to conduct a
search, the courts balance the intrusion of privacy rights against a
legitimate governmental interest.  The purpose behind this balanc-
ing test is to determine whether the suspicion is constitutionally
sufficient to conduct the search.  For these reasons, the dissent ob-
jected to the use of the balancing test in determining the constitu-
tionality of the DNA Act because no suspicion to search,
reasonable or not, ever exists at the time the DNA is collected.
IV: SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE
Currently, the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, along
with several other district and state courts, have upheld the consti-
tutionality of state and federal DNA statutes under the special
needs doctrine.96  Although these courts conceded that the collec-
tion of DNA constituted a suspicionless search, they concluded that
the DNA collection did not violate the Fourth Amendment be-
cause it served a non-law enforcement purpose.97
The special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment per-
mits suspicionless searches, in limited instances, where a program
serves a non-law enforcement purpose.  Two recent Supreme
Court decisions, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 98 and Ferguson v. City
of Charleston,99 reiterate the special needs doctrine first laid out in
Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.100
Under the special needs doctrine, “searches that would otherwise
96 Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (state DNA statute); United
States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1083
(2003) (federal DNA Act); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999) (state DNA
statute); Vore v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (D. Ariz.
2003) (federal DNA Act); Miller v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175-
78 (D. Kan. 2003) (federal DNA Act); United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315,
323 (D. Del. 2003) (federal DNA Act); United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142,
1169 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (federal DNA Act); State v. Martinez, 78 P.3d 769 (Kan. 2003)
(state DNA statute); State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1137 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003),
appeal denied, 809 N.E.2d 32 (Ohio 2004) (state DNA statute); In re D.L.C., 124
S.W.3d 354, 373 (Tex. App. 2003) (state DNA statute); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076,
1085-86 (Wash. 1993) (state DNA statute).
97 The dissent in Kincade noted that the special needs analysis used to uphold DNA
statutes undermined the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment to the same extent as
the plurality’s totality of the circumstances approach. See United States v. Kincade,
379 F.3d 813, 844, 854 (9th Cir. 2004).
98 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
99 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
100 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).  The Court held that school officials
may conduct warrantless searches of a student’s person and property as long as rea-
sonable suspicion exists to conduct the search. Id. at 347.
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violate the Fourth Amendment for lack of probable cause or indi-
vidualized suspicion are deemed constitutionally permissible be-
cause they serve ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.’”101
In determining whether a search qualifies under the special
needs exception, the court will first consider the primary purpose
of the program.  If the primary purpose serves a need beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, the court will weigh the govern-
mental interests against the individual’s privacy interests to deter-
mine whether the government’s need for a suspicionless search
outweighs the intrusion into an individual’s expectation of
privacy.102
A. Primary Purpose under the Special Needs Doctrine
According to the Supreme Court decisions in Edmond and Fer-
guson, suspicionless searches will not be exempted from ordinary
Fourth Amendment requirements if the primary purpose of the
program serves general law enforcement needs.103  In Edmond, the
Supreme Court clarified an earlier decision, Michigan Department of
State of Police v. Sitz, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a highway sobriety checkpoint program.104  Under this check-
point program, police officers stopped motorists briefly, without
any suspicion, to check for signs of intoxication.105  In reaching its
conclusion, the Supreme Court found that although the program
served a law enforcement need, the immediate objective of pro-
moting highway safety weighed heavily in favor of finding the sobri-
ety checkpoint program constitutional.106
The Court in Edmond struck down the city’s drug interdiction
checkpoints finding that the primary purpose did not serve a spe-
cial need beyond the normal need for law enforcement.107  The
101 United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d en banc, 379
F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004). See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
102 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).  In Skinner,
the Court determined that the primary purpose of the suspicionless search was to
promote railroad safety. Id. at 620-24.  After concluding that the purpose went be-
yond the normal need of law enforcement, the Court conducted a Fourth Amend-
ment balancing test, finding that the government’s interest in promoting public safety
justified the minimal intrusion of the search at issue absent a warrant or any individu-
alized suspicion. Id.
103 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-84.
104 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39 (citing Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990)).
105 Id. at 447.
106 Id. at 451; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39.
107 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
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Court distinguished this checkpoint from the one upheld in Sitz by
reiterating that the primary purpose of the checkpoint program
upheld in Sitz was to reduce the “immediate hazard” posed by
drunk drivers108 and that the Court “had never approved a check-
point program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”109  Although Sitz clearly involved
law enforcement purposes, the Supreme Court noted in Edmond
that it had upheld the constitutionality of the checkpoint at issue
in that case because the primary objective of the program was to
promote highway safety.110  The Supreme Court distinguished Ed-
mond from Sitz, finding that the checkpoint set up to interdict ille-
gal narcotics served the primary purpose of gathering evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing and therefore required individual-
ized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.111
The Supreme Court in Ferguson warned that “[t]he extensive
entanglement of law enforcement cannot be justified by reference
to legitimate needs.”112  The Court held that although drug reha-
bilitation was the ultimate goal of secretly testing pregnant women
for drugs, the program could not be upheld since the immediate
objective was to generate evidence for law enforcement pur-
poses.113  The Court’s opinions in Edmond and Ferguson made a dis-
tinction between a program’s primary or immediate purpose and
its ultimate objective.114  “Because law enforcement involvement al-
ways serves some broader social purpose or objective, virtually any
nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the
special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its
ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose.”115
The Supreme Court’s focus on the primary purpose poten-
tially leaves room for a secondary purpose of general crime con-
trol.  In Edmond, the Court did not decide whether a checkpoint
with a primary purpose of checking and verifying licenses and re-
gistration with a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics would
108 Id. at 39.
109 Id. at 41.
110 See id. at 41-42.
111 Id. The Court distinguished the approved checkpoint programs with the pro-
gram in Edmond and found that since the program in Edmond did not serve the pri-
mary purpose of policing the border or ensuring roadway safety, it could not be
upheld.  Note, however, that all of these programs serve law enforcement purposes;
the difference is whether the law enforcement purpose is primary or ancillary.
112 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.20.
113 Id. at 82-3.
114 Id. at 84; Edmonds, 531 U.S. at 42.
115 Ferguson, 531 U.S. at 84.
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qualify under the special needs doctrine.116  In applying these Su-
preme Court decisions, it would appear that if the primary purpose
of a program serves general law enforcement needs, it will be
struck down; whereas if the law enforcement purpose is ancillary,
the program may survive.117
1. Primary Purpose of the DNA Act
To determine whether a suspicionless search fits within the
special needs doctrine, courts must first identify its primary pur-
pose.  Recent decisions in both the state and federal courts within
the Second,118 Third,119 Fourth,120 Fifth,121 Seventh,122 and
Tenth123 Circuits have held that the “immediate objective” of state
and federal DNA statutes is to fill the DNA databanks with DNA
samples from qualifying offenders for identification purposes while
its “ultimate goal” is to solve past and future crimes.124  These
courts contend that the goal of filling CODIS goes beyond the or-
dinary purpose of law enforcement and therefore fits within the
special needs exception of the Fourth Amendment.  The courts’
interpretation of the DNA Act’s primary purpose is consistent with
the Act’s legislative history, which contains a congressional finding
that “[t]he development of DNA identification technology is one
of the most important advances in criminal identification methods
116 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2.
117 See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). See also
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (finding that the
primary purpose of drug testing railroad employees was to promote railway safety);
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (finding that drug testing
United States Customs Service employees served the primary purpose of ensuring the
safety and integrity of the Nation’s borders); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976) (finding that the primary purpose of the border checkpoints oper-
ated by law enforcement agents was to protect the nation’s borders); United States v.
Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 320 (D. Del. 2003) (stating that primary purpose may
not be ordinary law enforcement, but a non-ordinary law enforcement purpose might
qualify).
118 See, e.g., Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999); Nicholas v. Goord, No.
01 Civ. 7891, 2003 WL 256774, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003).
119 See, e.g., Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
120 See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Stegman,
295 F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Md. 2003).
121 See, e.g., Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir.
2004) (recognizing a “legitimate government interest in using DNA to investigate
crime”).
122 See, e.g., Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2004).
123 See, e.g., United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. de-
nied, 540 U.S. 1083 (2003).
124 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 840-41 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J.,
concurring).
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in decades.”125  Moreover, through the DNA Act, Congress pro-
vided federal assistance to enable states to eliminate the backlogs
of DNA samples which have not yet been analyzed or entered into
the databanks.126  During the proceedings and debates of the
106th Congress, Senator Kohl stated that the DNA Act “will help
police use modern technology to solve crimes and prevent repeat
offenders from committing new ones.”127
DNA has been used since the 1980s to positively identify and
exclude suspects of crimes.128  While the ultimate goal is to aid law
enforcement, its immediate purpose is to create a more reliable
identification system.129  Studies show that poor funding is the pri-
mary reason the DNA databanks are underused.130  The goal of the
DNA Act is to reduce the backlog, so that law enforcement agen-
cies can make better use of this modern identification system.
2. Ordinary Law Enforcement Purpose
The special needs exception of the Fourth Amendment’s war-
rant requirement is satisfied if the law enforcement purpose goes
beyond the ordinary need for law enforcement.131  There is dis-
crepancy among the circuits over the meaning of “ordinary law en-
forcement purpose.”  Several courts have held that filling CODIS
or a similar state DNA databank with DNA samples serves a pur-
pose beyond the normal need for law enforcement.132 However,
125 H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 9 (2000).
126 Id. at 18. See Nancy B. Gergoire, Federal Probation Joins the World of DNA Collection,
66 FED. PROBATION 30 (June 2002).
127 146 Cong. Rec. S11647 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000).
128 Steve Irsay, Cold Hits v. Civil Liberties: The Looming Debate Over Privacy and the DNA
Databases, at http://courttv.com/news/forensics/dna_anniv/databases.html (last
modified Apr. 24, 2003).
129 The DNA Act establishes a grant program that assists states in funding their
DNA analyses in order to help reduce the current backlogs.  As such, the Act pro-
motes the growth of DNA databanks as a more efficient identification system. See H.R.
Res. 900, 106th Cong. § 7 (1999); Stephanie Ward, A Roadblock for DNA-Testing Drive:
9th Circuit Panel Rules Federal Law Unconstitutional, 2 No. 40 A. B.A. J. E-REPORT 1 (Oct.
10, 2003) (quoting an attorney with the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, who re-
marked that DNA testing “is an excellent way to identify people”).
130 Hansen, DNA Study, supra note 7.
131 See Miller v. United States Parol Comm’n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1176 (D. Kan.
2003).
132 See, e.g., Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d. Cir. 1999) (concluding that Con-
necticut’s DNA databank statute fell within the special needs exception because stud-
ies show a high rate of recidivism among sexual offenders and DNA’s capability of
solving crimes); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that obtaining
reliable proof of a felon’s identity pursuant to Wisconsin’s DNA databank statute
serves a need beyond the ordinary need of law enforcement); United States v. Kimler,
335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1083 (2003) (concluding
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some courts have found that although searches under state and
federal DNA statutes serve ordinary law enforcement purposes,
they nevertheless comport with the Fourth Amendment.133 Kin-
cade’s dissent criticized the application of the special needs doc-
trine to uphold the DNA Act and instead found that the statute
served an ordinary law enforcement purpose, arguing that the Su-
preme Court has never upheld suspicionless searches in programs
that serve a general interest in law enforcement.134
However, the Supreme Court has found special needs beyond
normal law enforcement that justify suspicionless searches, such as
the supervision of regulated industries,135 implementation of bor-
der and sobriety checkpoints,136 supervision of probationers,137
and the operation of schools138 and prisons.139  In these examples,
that the creation of a DNA database goes “beyond the ordinary law enforcement
need”); Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2003 WL 256774, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6,
2003) (finding that DNA collection is not a “normal” or “ordinary” law enforcement
purpose); United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (D. Del. 2003) (finding
that “the use of probation officers, instead of law enforcement, suggests Congress’
intent to isolate this area from the responsibility of ordinary law enforcement”); State
v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1136-37 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, 809 N.E.2d 32
(Ohio 2004) (finding that collecting DNA samples for a state databank for the pur-
pose of creating a more accurate criminal justice system serves a need beyond the
ordinary need of law enforcement); Miller, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (finding that the
primary purpose of the DNA Act is to build a DNA databank, not to gather evidence
of a specific crime, serving a need beyond the ordinary need of law enforcement).
133 See, e.g., Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir.
2004) (finding that convicted felons have diminished privacy rights and therefore
DNA collection does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d
302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the accuracy of DNA identification and the
state’s legitimate interest in the identity of convicted felons justifies the minor intru-
sion of privacy); United States v. Stegman, 295 F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Md. 2003) (up-
holding the decision in Jones that the government’s interest in having DNA
identification on convicted felons outweighs the minimal intrusion).
134 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 854-55 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (citing, among others, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41
(2000) and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001)).
135 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989)
(finding that special needs justified regulating the conduct of railroad employees to
ensure railway safety). See also Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(finding that special needs justified drug testing United States Customs Service em-
ployees to ensure the safety and protection of the U.S. borders).
136 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding bor-
der checkpoints to ensure national safety); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoints to promote highway safety).
137 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). See also United States v. Lifshitz,
363 F.3d 173, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that under the “special needs” doctrine,
“searches for probationary purposes will be upheld if authorized by a law that is in
itself reasonable”).
138 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Co. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 824 (2002) (upholding a school drug testing policy based on the gov-
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the Court has permitted suspicionless searches without a showing
of probable cause or a warrant because they involve programs or
activities “not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforce-
ment.”140  Instead, the Supreme Court found that all of these pro-
grams served needs beyond the ordinary duties and expectations of
police officers.
3. DNA Collection: Ordinary Law Enforcement?
The primary objective of collecting DNA samples serves a law
enforcement purpose.  However, according to the Second, Sev-
enth, and Tenth Circuits, along with several state supreme courts
and federal district courts, collecting DNA samples goes beyond
the ordinary need for law enforcement because “it is not under-
taken for the investigation of a specific crime.”141  Police officers
are not forensic scientists who can analyze DNA samples;142 the
CODIS system serves a need outside the realm of ordinary law en-
forcement and therefore fits within the special needs doctrine.  In
Skinner, the Court upheld the drug testing of railway employees
“not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but rather to pre-
vent accidents and casualties.”143  Similarly, the Supreme Court will
likely find that the purpose of the DNA Act is to fill the gaps in
ernment’s interest in preventing and deterring childhood drug use). See also
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
139 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (finding that the governmental
interest in “maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and disci-
pline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained con-
stitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees” justified the body
cavity inspections of inmates after “contact visits” under the special needs doctrine).
See also Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1196 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding blood testing
of inmates for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in order to control
and prevent the spread of AIDS in prison).
140 Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989). See Skinner v. Rail-
way Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
141 Green, 354 F.3d at 678 (quoting Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-51
(D. Wisc. 1996)). See United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1083 (2003); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999); Vore v.
Dept of Justice, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Ariz. 2003); Miller v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,
259 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Kan. 2003); United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315,
325 (D. Del. 2003); United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (S.D. Cal. 2002);
State v. Martinez, 78 P.3d 769 (Kan. 2003); State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1136
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, 809 N.E.2d 32 (Ohio 2004).
142 In most cases, the probation officers make arrangements with laboratories that
collect the DNA samples.  The police officers, themselves are generally not collecting
the samples. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 18 (2000). See also Sczubelek, 255 F.
Supp. 2d at 323 (stating that the use of probation officers to carry out the DNA Act
reflects Congress’ intent to separate this responsibility from ordinary law
enforcement).
143 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989).
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CODIS, not to gather evidence for the law enforcement authori-
ties.144  Thus, if law enforcement gathers evidence, it is merely inci-
dental and not the primary motive of the DNA Act or similar state
DNA collection statutes.  Studies show that there is a high rate of
recidivism among violent felons.145  The CODIS system enables law
enforcement to accurately identify these violent individuals, which
will result in a safer society.146
The DNA Act should be distinguished from the programs in
Edmond and Ferguson where evidence was gathered to determine
whether a particular individual had committed a specific criminal
act.147  A DNA sample does not generate evidence of any specific
crime or wrongdoing;148 rather, it offers “reliable proof of a felon’s
identity.”149
Although the law enforcement aspects of the DNA Act are en-
tangled in its ultimate objective, as in Edmond and Ferguson, the
DNA Act is more closely related to the border and sobriety check-
point programs upheld in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte150 and
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz.151  The Court upheld these
programs even though they served law enforcement purposes, rea-
soning that because the primary purposes served special need be-
yond ordinary law enforcement, the secondary law enforcement
purposes could survive.152
Based on the history in the lower courts, it seems likely that
the Supreme Court will uphold the DNA Act and similar state DNA
collection statutes because their primary purpose is to fill the DNA
indexing system with DNA samples in order to solve future
144 See Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir.
2004) (recognizing the importance of correct identification of inmates through DNA
sample collection as has been done through fingerprinting); Green, 354 F.3d at 677;
Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146; Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999); Jones v.
Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992); Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2003
WL 256774, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003); Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (D. Del.
2003); United States v. Stegman, 295 F. Supp. 2d 542 (D. Md. 2003).
145 See FRIDELL, supra note 23, at 67. See also Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 82.
146 See FRIDELL, supra note 23, at 67.
147 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (where police officers
stopped motorists to discover the presence of drugs, which produced evidence that a
specific driver had engaged in illegal drug trafficking); Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67 (2001) (where the drug test results of pregnant women were handed over
to law enforcement, thereby inculpating certain women of specific criminal
wrongdoing).
148 See Nicholas, 2003 WL 256774, at *13; Green, 354 F.3d at 678.
149 Green, 354 F.3d at 678.
150 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
151 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
152 See infra, Part IV (A) (1).
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crimes.153 DNA is the most reliable form of identification in our
modern time154 and serves a need beyond ordinary law enforce-
ment.  Although the ancillary purposes of the DNA Act may serve
ordinary law enforcement needs, particularly investigating and
prosecuting crimes, the Supreme Court will likely uphold the DNA
collection statutes because their immediate and primary objective is
to build a reliable identification system of federally convicted
felons through the use of DNA.
B. Fourth Amendment Balancing Test: Totality of the Circumstances
If a court finds that the primary purpose of a search goes be-
yond the ordinary need for law enforcement, it must next conduct
a traditional Fourth Amendment totality of the circumstances bal-
ancing test.  This test weighs the intrusion on an individual’s pri-
vacy interest against the government’s special need that supported
the program.155 The court must consider whether the govern-
ment’s interest in filling the CODIS system with DNA samples justi-
fies intrusions on the diminished privacy rights of qualifying
convicted felons.  Courts upholding federal and state DNA statutes
using the special needs doctrine have found that the government’s
need to fill CODIS and obtain reliable and accurate identification
of convicted felons coupled with the minimal intrusion of taking a
DNA sample outweigh a probationer’s diminished privacy rights.
V: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: COLLECT DNA SAMPLES
THROUGH BOOKING
The standard police “booking” procedures could be the an-
swer to the debate over the constitutionality of federal and state
DNA collection statutes, since these procedures are exempt from
the usual requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  “[R]easonable
153 See, e.g., Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir.
2004); Green, 354 F.3d at 677; United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1083, (2003); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir.
1999); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992); Nicholas, 2003 WL 256774,
at *12; Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (D. Del. 2003); United States v. Stegman, 295
F. Supp. 2d 542, 545-46 (D. Md.  2003).
154 H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 9 (2000).  The House Report noted that “[t]he
development of DNA identification technology is one of the most important advances
in criminal identification methods in decades.”
155 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 620-24 (1989); Miller v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 259 F. Supp. 2d
1166, 1177 (D. Kan. 2003) (following the Fourth Amendment balancing test em-
ployed in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) and Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), requiring that the search be reasonable).
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police procedures, performed to effectuate a governmental inter-
est, other than the discovery of incriminating evidence, do not con-
stitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
[a]nd they do not become a search merely because in the course of
these activities, evidence is discovered.”156 An individual in lawful
custody may be required to submit to photographing and finger-
printing as a part of the routine identification process.157  Where
there is a legitimate governmental interest in the positive identifi-
cation of a person arrested or charged with a crime, fingerprinting
is the typical method used for obtaining reliable identification of
the accused.158 Courts have upheld other reasonable methods for
securing an individual’s identification, such as photographs,159
handwriting exemplars,160 and measurements taken under the Ber-
tillon system.161
DNA collection should be added to the standard police “book-
ing” procedures because it is the most reliable form of identifica-
tion known today, surpassing the capability of fingerprinting with
its ability to solve unsolvable crimes.162 The DNA samples of quali-
fying convicted felons would be collected for entry into state and
federal DNA databanks for identification purposes only; any “cold
156 United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217, 225 (D. Ohio 1968).
157 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (finding that
a person in lawful custody must submit to photographing and fingerprinting); Napoli-
tano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965) (taking an individual’s finger-
prints is a “universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights”);
Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. at 225 (fingerprinting arrested individuals or those for-
mally charged with a crime does not constitute a search or seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Amorosa, 167 F.2d 596, 599 (3d Cir.
1948) (finding that the photograph of the defendant taken at the time of his arrest
was part of the routine identification process).
158 Laub Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. at 225.
159 See Mabry v. Kettering, 122 S.W. 115 (Ark. 1909) (holding that photographs of
accused persons may be used for identification purposes). See also Bartella v.
McFeeley, 152 A. 17 (N.J. Ch. 1930) (holding that police may lawfully photograph an
arrestee without consent).
160 See Dist. Att’y of Kings County v. Angelo G., 371 N.Y.S.2d 127, 130 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1975) (holding that forcing a free person to give handwriting exemplars does not
constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
161 See Downs v. Swann, 73 A. 653, 654 (Md. 1909).  The Bertillon system involves
photographing and fingerprinting an individual, as well as taking measurements of
the individual’s head, height, age, color, and pedigree to be preserved on record for
police use. See also Bartella, 152 A. 17 (holding that police may lawfully take an arres-
tee’s measurements without consent).
162 More and more prosecutors rely on DNA evidence to solve crimes. See FRIDELL,
supra note 23, at 64; LEE, supra note 22, at 291 (referring to DNA analysis as “revolu-
tionary technology” that has “solved countless crimes, including cold cases”).
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hits” retrieved by the databank would be merely incidental and
would not constitute a search.
The hesitancy in instituting DNA collection as a part of the
booking process is parallel to the initial caution of taking finger-
prints at the time of arrest.  However, courts quickly began to ac-
cept and recognize fingerprinting procedures as standard practice
since they were the most reliable form of identification at the
time.163  In a case decided in the early 1900’s, the court addressed
the growing need for a more efficient means of an accused per-
son’s identification:
The populous communities which now exist, and the modern
facilities for swift and frequent communication and rapid
transit, afford hitherto unknown facilities for evading arrest or
fleeing from justice, which should be offset in the public interest
by providing the agencies, charged with the duty of preserving
the public peace and arresting persons reasonably suspected of
the commission of crimes, with the most efficient means of de-
tecting and identifying them . . . .164
Currently, few states have implemented laws requiring DNA
collection at the time of arrest.165  Virginia, Louisiana, and Texas
are pioneers of this movement, enacting “arrestee testing” legisla-
tion, which makes DNA collection part of the booking process for
people arrested for violent crimes.166 A few states have recently
passed less comprehensive legislation that includes DNA collection
in their state’s booking procedures in certain limited circum-
stances.167 Other states have proposed “arrestee testing”
legislation.168
163 See Phillip B.C. Jones, Arresting Developments in DNA Typing, at www.forensic-evi-
dence.com/site/Biol_Evid/BioEvid_dna_jones.html (last visited Nov. 4. 2004).
164 Downs v. Swann, 73 A. 653, 655 (Md. 1909).
165 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (Michie 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609
(West 2004); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1471(b).
166 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (Michie 2004) (“Every person arrested for the
commission or attempted commission of a violent felony . . . or a violation or attempt
to commit a violation . . . or shall have a sample of his saliva or tissue taken for DNA
analysis to determine identification characteristics specific to the person.”); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:609 (West 2004) (“A person who is arrested for a felony or other
specified offense . . . shall have a DNA sample drawn or taken at the same time he is
fingerprinted pursuant to the booking procedure.”  § 15:609(A)(1).  Pursuant to sec-
tion 601(A)(2), the DNA sample requirement also applies to juveniles arrested for a
felony-grade delinquent act.); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1471(b) (“After a defen-
dant . . . is indicted or waives indictment, the court in which the case is pending shall
require the defendant to provide to a law enforcement agency one or more speci-
mens for the purpose of creating a DNA record.”).
167 See Auken, supra note 6.
168 N.Y. State S., S5099, Reg. Sess. 2003-2004 (May 16, 2003); Colorado, SB 03-128,
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Like fingerprinting, DNA collection would not constitute a
Fourth Amendment search or seizure; the sample would not be
taken for investigative purposes.  Rather, the sample would be
taken to secure a reliable form of identification of an individual
who has been arrested or charged with a crime.  As with finger-
printing, securing the sample would involve an administrative pro-
cess and would not become a search for potentially incriminating
evidence.  Our government has a legitimate interest in obtaining
the most reliable identification of individuals charged with crimes
and should have the authority to secure DNA samples from such
persons, as it is the most reliable form of identification in modern
society.
CONCLUSION
The collection of DNA samples pursuant to federal and state
DNA collection statutes will likely be upheld by the Supreme Court
using the special needs doctrine or affirmed as a standard booking
procedure.  Because of the tremendous benefits and results of
these DNA databanks, the courts are willing to circumvent the
stringent standards of the Fourth Amendment.169  DNA is a useful
way to identify people and experts and attorneys predict that the
databanks will deter criminals from committing more crimes.170
The Supreme Court decisions in Edmond and Ferguson left many
loopholes in the special needs doctrine for suspicionless searches
to be upheld under programs and activities which serve law en-
forcement purposes.  In light of the number of crimes prevented
and solved through the use of local, state, and federal DNA
databanks, the Supreme Court will likely uphold the collection of
DNA from qualifying convicted offenders favoring law enforce-
ment interests over prisoners’ rights.171
64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Co. 2003); and Arizona, HB 2674, 45th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2002).
169 See Mark Hansen, Courts Consider DNA Databanks, 90 A.B.A. J. 41 (May 2004)
[hereinafter Courts].
170 See Mark Hansen, DNA Dragnet, 90 A.B.A. J. 38 (May 2004). See also Mike McKee,
9th Circuit Scoffs at Forced DNA Testing, 229 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 4, at http://www.
law-forensic.com/cfr_dna_backlog_8.htm (Oct. 6, 2003).
171 See Hansen, Courts, supra note 169.
